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Abstract
Throughout history, financial bubbles have been shrouded in fear and misunderstanding,
with hope, greed, and hearsay fueling inane degrees of risk-taking amongst financial
powerhouses and the common retail investor alike. While many studies have been conducted to
delve into the unique attributes, causes, effects, and consequences of almost every crisis since
adequate data could be recorded and preserved, it is not common for the varying types of crises
to be directly compared in their core attributes and price movements. This paper conducts such
an examination, with a look into ten different crises across the equity, real estate, and oil markets
to compare volatility trends, key bubble statistical indicators, and sensitivity to common
economic measuring points. It will be shown that while great differences do exist among many
catastrophic collapses, several interesting points of significance emerge across both time and
asset class that may inform greater research into investor psychology and what motivates the
beginning and end of a financial bubble.

“Men, it has been well said, think in herds; it will be seen that they go mad in herds, while they
only recover their senses slowly, and one by one.” -Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds (1841)
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1. Introduction
The exact definition of a financial bubble is difficult to pin down. It is commonly used as an
inexact term to describe a rapid acceleration and subsequent plummet in an asset’s price, usually
facilitated by the idea that some new phenomenon or temporary economic condition has achieved
permanence, followed by the eventual realization that the shift was transient, which results in
investors shifting their attitudes and allocations to recorrect.

However, such a broad

summarization fails to exactly benchmark or delineate the idea of a bubble. It is different from a
market pullback, correction, or bear market, which are respectively defined as market drops of 510%, 10-20%, and more than 20% (CME Group). It sometimes can coincide with, cause, or result
from an economic recession, but this is not a prerequisite feature, as captured by crises in more
niche markets. It is paradoxically difficult to see when it is forming, yet obvious in its presence
with hindsight, making market timing all but impossible. If such a phenomenon is so difficult to
adequately understand explicitly, how then can we hope to properly study it across time? Perhaps
in struggling to precisely define what a bubble is, it is important to understand what it is not.
A financial bubble is not rational. Investors usually do not use their normal methods, analysis,
or diligence processes when caught up in the cloud of a bubble. This can be seen in several recent
examples with Ark Invest’s $1 million price target on Bitcoin for 2030 (Ark Investment
Management LLC), WeWork’s much maligned use of “community adjusted EBITDA” before
their collapse (Axios), or Reddit-fueled retail investing hordes’ chants of “to the moon” when
facing down institutional investors like Melvin Capital in the GameStop meme saga (WSJ). A
financial bubble is not always short in duration. As seen in this study, crises have a variety of
lengths and different measurement points, including the bubble buildup, the bubble burst, and the
total bubble periods. Within this study’s sample, the average buildup lasts for 1,379 days, with a

minimum of 174 days and a maximum of 2,933 days; the average bust lasts for 970 days, with a
minimum of 176 days and a maximum of 2,435 days; the average total bubble lasts for 2,348 days,
with a minimum of 455 days and a maximum of 3,969 days. A financial bubble is not (adding in
one more criterion here with example, modeled the same as previous two). A financial bubble
does not just affect the profits of influential elites on Wall Street. A common theme in the
aftermath of crises is to lay blame solely at the feet of the financial markets and its “sophisticated”
players. They are neither the single guilty party nor the most egregious source of risk-taking in
the financial framework. Though it is certain the origins, packaging, and liquidity of the volatile
assets are facilitated by financial markets, it is the wider economic willingness to believe in the
story that is “too good to be true” that creates a catalyst for adoption and a fear of missing out that
fuels the entire volatility architecture of a bubble. As will be displayed in this paper’s results,
volatility and momentum are the primary drivers of almost every financial bubble.
The relevance of the crisis categories examined for this study, as well as each individual crisis,
is important to note, especially in terms of the market dynamics that other researchers have
identified and studied in their own work that can lend to a cross-sectional analysis. It is this paper’s
goal to understand the broad market relationship that volatility and certain economic indicators
have with asset prices during a financial bubble. While the result of higher market volatility
lending to the speed and size of a bubble makes clear intuitive sense, it is of greater significance
to understand how the lagged price and volatility significances vary and change between crisis
types and time periods, as well as any pertinent relationships found with other economic
covariates. The contribution of this study lies not in its statistical complexity or economic
invention, but rather in its aggregation of many segregated market types and time periods to create
a broader understanding for triggers that are “market-moving.”

There will be three main market categories studied in this paper: equities, real estate, and oil.
The first category, stocks, includes The South Sea Bubble (1719-1720), the Roaring Twenties
(1921-1932), the Asian Financial Crisis (1992-1998), the Dot Com Crash (1995-2002), and the
Chinese Stock Bubble (2005-2008). The South Sea Bubble data will examine an aggregated index
of seven companies in Great Britain affiliated with trans-Atlantic trade, with exuberance in the
companies pushed by the creation of insurance corporations that alleviated risk concerns for some
investors. The Roaring Twenties data will study indexed equity prices compiled by The Cowles
Commission for Research in Economics during the 1920s and early 1930s (Cowles, 2022), which
captures the speculative fever that enveloped the U.S. before adequate securities regulations were
introduced. The Asian Financial Crisis data utilizes the Korean index KOSPI to model the surge
in financial markets throughout Asia in this period that resulted largely from massive inflows and
outflows of foreign investment. The Dot Com Crash data will investigate the dramatic fall of the
S&P 500 Information Technology Index, after a large run-up in early Internet companies at the
end of the 20th century created a significant gap between market expectations and realities for
companies with virtually no sales. The Chinese Stock Bubble data will examine the Shanghai SE
Index during a runup in equity prices coinciding with the onslaught of the Great Financial Crisis.
Based on typical investor practices for pricing and modeling equities with free cash flows and
discount rates, it is expected that central bank interest rates and industrial growth will be significant
covariates for these crises, with the additional expectation that, as with all the crises studied, lagged
prices will create meaningful momentum to continuously drive existing prices up during the bubble
periods.
The South Sea Bubble was one of the first episodes of wild speculation in recorded
financial market history, involving three interwoven crises, the Mississippi Bubble, the South Sea

Bubble, and the Dutch Windhandel (Frehen, R.G.P., Goetzmann, W.N., Rouwenhorst, K.G.,
2009). The main driver of the crisis was perceived innovation in the insurance and Atlantic
shipping trade, the first such instance with data where human progress in an area became
overblown by expected financial gains, resulting in the formation of a market bubble in stocks of
the affiliated companies (Pastor and Veronesi, 2009). While insider trading and arbitraging have
been found to be significant contributing factors to other early crises before the implementation of
stronger regulatory rules, it is unlikely that such causes contributed to this crisis, as a great deal of
the financial collapse was driven by an inability to meaningfully deliver on expectations of
shipping from the New World (Frehen et al.). The data used to study this crisis in this paper comes
from Frehen et al., which is publicly available.
A classic look at the Roaring Twenties bubble is that of an economy-wide credit bubble,
(Eichengreen, B., Mitchener, K., 2003). Such a view, which has ties in its formation to the Dot
Com Crisis to be discussed further later, focuses on the role runaway credit markets played in
facilitating a competitive environment amongst lenders that led to decreased diligence and massive
risk undertaking. Financial innovation can be seen to be a great contributor to the exuberance of
the time, with hype surrounding emerging network technologies that were not yet ready for mass
deployment and failure at the nascent Federal Reserve to properly monitor and steer financial
markets with their existing power. It should not be said that the credit market was the sole, or even
the main contributing factor to the Great Depression, but an exploration of this bubble is important
to understand how much of it may have been driven by credit-related factors, other economic
drivers, or its own generated momentum.
An exploration of the Asian Financial Crisis yields existing structural weaknesses in the
economic conditions of many emerging markets in the Asian continent, including discrepancies in

current account balances, the composition of capital flows into and out of countries, credit
overleverage, and banking issues (Corsetti, G., Pesenti, P., Roubini, N., 1999). Both policy and
structural changes in Asian countries that suffered from the bubble may have played an inordinate
role in investor crowding and market sentiment that generated real economic gains and losses at
this time. This bubble provides an opportunity to explore how surging asset prices in an exportdriven economy can drive or be driven by real economic factors that create an environment for
industrial development and foreign investor risk appetite, which can be seen to subsequently
recede as expanded expectations for these developing economies implode.
An examination of the Dot Com Crisis offers a differentiated perspective on financial
bubbles through the introduction of stock lockups and insider selling as important factors to
consider (Ofek, E., Richardson M., 2003). The Dot Com era was hallmarked by the surge in
significant and unprecedented block holdings, with subsequent trades of such massive stakes
greatly affecting the bubble’s steep rise and swift fall. It can be seen that the fall of the Dot Com
era was precipitated by an unprecedented lockup expiration that flooded the markets with insiders
looking to liquidate their richly valued positions. Once the selling intensified with enough
expirations, confidence eroded in the Internet companies where so much stock was being sold by
insiders, leading the wider market to sense weakness or overvaluation and flood out as well. This
insider-driven bubble is distinct in its attributes from other bubbles to be studied that are driven
more by outside investors who do not have a majority of their income coming from the company
they may be invested in.
Corporate earnings, measures for an equity risk premium, and the risk-free interest rate are
all important factors for the sharp rise in Chinese stock valuations from April 1999 through
September 2009 (Bondt, G.J., Peltonen, T.A., Santabárbara, D., 2010). Evidence exists for price

misallocations resulting from several sources during booms and busts in Chinese markets,
including equity market reform pursued by the authoritarian government, excessive available
capital from both foreign and domestic sources, and changes in deposit rates enacted by Chinese
regulators and central bankers. A fundamentals-based approach to model equity values can be
seen to be successful, through implementing both a dynamic present value model and empirical
valuation techniques (Campbell and Shiller, 1988 and de Bondt, 2008). The idea that traditional
fundamentals-based valuation could be used to properly model and allocate capital within Chinese
equity markets is a novel one to researchers, with previous ideas centering on Chinese equities
trading on sentiment and diverging in their financial valuation from more mature equity markets
that thought to be more founded on business fundamentals and financial results.
The second market category, real estate, includes the Japanese Real Estate Crash (19841992) and the U.S. Housing Crisis (2002-2009). The Japanese Real Estate Crash will investigate
the ramifications of emerging financial institutions in a foreign market, with a heavy emphasis on
urban redevelopment and the domination of property markets by investor capital. The U.S.
Housing Crisis will assess the extent of financial derivatives’ impact on a market poised for
growth, but with a financial system that extended borrowing and building beyond the limits of
owners’ ability to absorb rising financing costs. It is expected that nominal interest rates and
monetary growth will be the most significant covariates for the real estate market due to the direct
impact rates have on mortgage lending and the economic boost that strong monetary growth
usually facilitates, which often manifests for average citizens in increased home purchases, and
subsequently inflating prices.
A deep dive into the property boom and bust in the Japanese market during the 1980s and
early 1990s finds a significant role is played by financial institutions in exacerbating the formation

of a financial asset and real estate bubble, with requisite property finance infrastructure arising to
meet the increased levels of demand and speculation (Oizumi, E., 1993). Specifically, tightening
monetary policy from the Bank of Japan can be seen to act as a catalyst to cool the exuberant
market at the end of 1989, which led to a series of so-called “bubble bankruptcies.” Interestingly,
the land domination that began to rise during the bubble actually increased as a result of the crash,
rather than collapsing like so much of the finance capital that fled Japan at this time. Evidence for
this can be found in observances of consolidation among capital providers, domestic policies
geared at restoring faith in the property market, and the increased risk of real estate investment,
which can often only be taken on after the crisis by large institutional players.
An exploration of the Great Financial Crisis requires a multi-geographical analysis of the
housing bust, as real estate in the United States is an extremely regional market (Cohen, J.P.,
Coughlin, C.C., and Lopez D.A., 2012). A pricing survey finds that the bubble became most
volatile in metropolitan areas, with 7 of 19 identified areas having experienced real declines over
the course of the eventual bust. Pricing differences between houses of varying starting prices can
be seen to exist, with lower-priced homes increasing by significantly more during the boom, while
higher-priced homes performed better through the duration of the crisis.

Additionally,

appreciation in land values was more significant to the overall bubble than the price of the actual
housing structures being built, implying that the financial bubble may not have been as linked to
factors such as industrial production growth as one might think when studying a real estate bubble.
The third category, oil, includes the Stagflation Oil Crisis (1978-1986), the 2008 Oil Shock
(2003-2008), and the 2010s Oil Collapse (2009-2016). The Stagflation Oil Crisis will examine
the market trajectory of oil following the impacts of a staggering U.S. economy through a majority
of the 1970s with the dual threat of rising inflation and unemployment, which was finally wrangled

into submission in part by subduing rapid commodity inflation. The 2008 Oil Shock will
investigate market dynamics of a commodity crisis in the throes of a recession, as the global
economy was the collapse coincides with the Great Recession. The 2010s Oil Collapse will assess
the dynamics of the back half of a double dip in oil following the 2008 price bubble, which is
interesting to consider given the relatively smooth transition from bubble to crash twice over.
When considering what variables are most likely to impact commodities, inflation and
unemployment seem like the two most likely, as both factors help to inform consumer demand for
main use cases of oil, such as gas used in family road trips or petroleum used to create plastic
products flying off consumer shelves.
A focus on the Stagflation Oil Crisis finds both the inherent difficulties of attempting to
assign a significant role to oil in such a far-reaching crisis, as well as the exogenous nature of oil
price movements when crises in the market do occur (Barsky, R., Kilian, L, 2004). It can be argued
that widespread perceptions about the causality of oil prices on macroeconomic factors are actually
reversed, with macroeconomic factors creating oil price shifts rather than vice versa. Under such
a premise, claims that the 1970s stagflation may have been the result of an oil crisis would be illinformed and incorrect.
When examining the 2007-08 oil price shock relative to previous oil crises one of the
significant differences may be found in the occurrence of inflation (Hamilton, J.D., 2009).
Whereas previous oil bubbles throughout recorded history are driven mostly by supply disruptions
alone, the 2007-08 case presented a dual shock in the form of spiking demand and lagging supply.
Similarities exist in the eventual effects of the bubble, with consumer spending and automobile
purchases both taking significant hits as gasoline prices ate more into consumers’ wallets. The
effects of the commodity crisis are important in the context of the global recession during this

same time period, which may or may not have been extended or worsened by the existence of such
energy market shocks.
The 2010s Oil Collapse is quite more interesting upon a second glance, with its connection
to a so-called commodities super-cycle carrying over from the 2008 Oil Shock (Baffes, J., Kose,
M.A., Ohnsorge, F., Stocker, M., 2015). Several proximate causes for the price collapse can be
identified, including innovations in the oil production space that led to unexpected supply
increases, a downtrend in global oil demand, easing of geopolitical tensions, and an upswing in
the U.S. currency. Overall, the effects of the bubble appear to be largely positive for the global
economy, as a downward trajectory for oil prices allows for an easier flow of international trade
and all kinds of economic activities that directly and indirectly benefit from the tailwind. However,
it should be noted that while there are numerous benefits to oil prices falling, oil exporters
experience a significant decline in their business that is immediately realized, while the previously
mentioned benefits take months, or even years, to properly materialize.

2. Literature Review
In beginning to place this research in the context of wider economic literature, a few important
questions arise with respect to the idea and definition of a “bubble.” What exactly constitutes a
bubble? How can one be identified for study? Why is an understanding of bubble characteristics
and dynamics an important area of academic research? What are the consequences of proper
versus misinformed understandings of bubbles? While this paper does not attempt to create a
model or new avenue of understanding for how to examine bubbles, it does take a unique
perspective in examining bubble dynamics across time and asset class. This kind of cross-sectional
analysis has not been previously studied, as it is often neater and more cogent for theoretical work
to make an argument using a single market example, if a practical market at all, rather than a
theoretical one. Based on the body of existing literature, there appears to be a gap between
theorists who use niche market scenarios, or even manufactured market settings, to study their
proposed theories and practitioners who deal in dynamic, “messy” market conditions every day.
This research proposes to offer the first layer of bridging such a gap, as a theoretical framework
brought to analyze the patterns of important, historical market bubbles that are often the subject of
much financial commentary, but not academic research. The “mess” of many confounding factors
present in the real world’s bubbles will be parsed to understand if certain time and market-specific
factors affect the trading patterns that are seen in bubbles, comparing such results with existing
theoretical frameworks to discover which ideas merit further development for particular market
regimes.
The definition of a market bubble can most aptly be described theoretically by Evanoff,
Kaufman, Malliaris (2012), who state that a bubble “exists when the market price of an asset
exceeds its price determined by fundamental factors by a significant amount for a prolonged period

of time.” While this is not the hard and fast definition that might be hoped for in a statistical
examination of bubbles, every bubble is different. As will be demonstrated in the bubbles studied
in this research, assets vary widely in terms of relative price volatility and trading frequency. What
may constitute bubble-like behavior for a traditional asset like real estate may be normal volatility
for a distinct asset, like Bitcoin. It is important to understand the relevance of such nuances in
developing an appropriate labeling of bubbles, especially as this research reaches across asset
classes for comparison purposes. With regard to the importance of understanding bubbles,
Evanoff, et al. (2012) captures the essence of public interest in terms of being able to properly
gauge and respond to market bubble behavior. In crises that can affect an entire country’s, or even
the world’s, economic stability, policy interventions during or after market bubbles can be the
difference between a correction in a particular asset class and the total collapse of a critical market
or economic system. Proper bubble frameworks that match the reality of bubble dynamics must
be utilized by monetary policy makers to inform decisions and generate beneficial, yet realistic,
policy proposals.
Despite their importance to broad economic conditions and the public welfare, bubbles are not
universally accepted as a phenomenon by all economists and financial academics. Various
explanations have been offered over time for explaining bubble behavior, including purely rational
mathematical models that explain large price and transaction volume swings, to investors’ hedging
needs for other investments, agency problems within institutions, and even investor gambling
behavior. These particular explanations are put forward and dismissed by Xiong and Yu (2011),
who examined a bubble in over a dozen Chinese warrants between 2005-2008 that were essentially
worthless due to being deeply out of the money but traded frequently above their theoretical value.
This paper finds that particularly important drivers of bubbles are short-sales constraints and

heterogeneous beliefs on price, in addition to the inflow of new investors contributing to the
prolonging of such formed bubbles. The paper provides direct evidence of feedback effects in the
warrant returns and indirect evidence of “smart” investors, who are said to “ride” the bubble and
its elevated returns. The ideas of investor beliefs and the flow of new investors is seen in other
research as well, providing credence that such ideas may be pervasive across various bubble types.
Another study of interest in the Chinese market explores the combination of extrapolative
beliefs and a disposition effect, which are demonstrated to be contributory factors to the investor
belief and new investor inflow ideas proposed in Xiong and Yu (2011). Liao and Peng (2019)
examine the 2014-2015 Chinese stock market bubble and meshe together the mechanics involved
with high prices paired with high transaction volume, a difficult phenomenon to explain when
taken in conjunction with extrapolative beliefs. Essentially the problem this paper confronts is
that investors with extrapolative beliefs will want to buy a stock because it has recently gone, but
also seem to be exiting into and out of the assets quickly, which is counterintuitive to their
extrapolative beliefs. Disposition effects, or the tendency for investors to sell stocks trading at a
gain while holding on to those trading at a loss, are offered as an explanation for the odd trading
patterns. It is demonstrated that investors motivated by extrapolation and disposition effects
increase their trading volume by about 800% at bubble peaks, offering an important glimpse into
the kinds of investors moving markets during a bubble formation. The realization utility of such
investors, paired with the modern ability to margin trade, appear to be strong factors in the market
behavior seen in bubble conditions.
Finally, Weitzal, et al. (2019) contribute a meaningful market consideration in their research’s
comparisons of bubble formation in student, professional, and intermixed groups within an
experimental market setting. It is worth noting in its own right that this study demonstrates a

unique aspect of some research niches in this topic area, which is the introduction of lab-based
market environments to study particular hypotheses about market reactions or isolate distinct
variables pertinent to certain market participants. While such experiments obviously create a large
abstraction from the real-world market environment, the results of this research are striking in the
realization of persistent bubble formations across groups with varying “professional” dynamics.
Bubbles are clearly displayed to be a relatively ordinary phenomenon, as 25% of professional
market groups generated bubbles, while 58% of student groups generated bubbles. Importantly, it
is demonstrated that professionals play a kind of stabilizing role in markets, as intermixed market
groups achieved bubble formation rates almost identical to the professional-only groups, indicating
that there is a relative scale in the likelihood of a bubble, proportional to the makeup of a market’s
participants. Additionally, heterogeneous beliefs about future prices are seen to be a strong
predictor of price inefficiencies and bubble conditions, further supporting findings from the papers
previously discussed that bubbles are a kind of expectations game fueled by investor psychology.

3. Methods and Data
The main methods used to analyze crisis data over the varying crisis periods are OLS
regressions to study covariate relationships and GARCH analyses to study volatilities. Several
different regression equations are constructed for analysis, with variations in the models including
different covariates and different time periods over which to examine the reaction of price data.
The dependent variable for all regression equations is the difference in asset returns between data
point measures, described below by equation (1)
(1)

Difft = Returnt – Returnt-1

Covariates for the regressions include a variety of economic indicators and their lagged values.
The source and importance of each covariate will be described in detail below, but as a brief
synopsis the covariates include: lagged dependent variable (Difft-1), nominal interest rates (it),
lagged nominal interest rates (it-1), inflation rates (πt), lagged inflation rates (πt-1), unemployment
rates (ut), lagged unemployment rates (ut-1), industrial production growth rates (idt), lagged
industrial production growth (idt-1), growth in the money supply (mt), and lagged growth in the
money supply (mt-1).
Five regression analyses are conducted for this study including:
•

A regression through the entire period of interest with only variables at time t (Regression
1)

•

A regression through the entire period of interest with variables at time t and lagged
variables at time t-1 (Regression 2)

•

A regression through the rise of the asset price from the beginning of the study period
until its peak price with variables at time t (Regression 3)

•

A regression through the crash of the asset price from the peak price to the end of the
study period with variables at time t (Regression 4)

•

A regression through the most intense volatility of the asset price, which is defined to be
the year of the asset price peak, beginning five months before the peak price and ending
six months after the peak price for a total of only twelve months of data with variables at
time t (Regression 5)

The equation used for Regressions 1 and 3-5, as well as the equation for Regression 2 are
detailed below in equations (2) and (3) respectively:
(2) Difft = β1Difft-1 + β2it + β3πt + β4ut + β5idt + β6mt + εt
(3) Difft = β1Difft-1 + β2it + β3it-1 + β4πt + β5πt-1 + β6ut + β7ut-1 + β8idt + β9idt-1 + β10mt +
β11mt-1 + εt
Interest rates are captured on a nominal basis from the market country’s respective central bank
discount rate. These government-set rates give an idea of the underlying economic environment
as they are a primary monetary policy tool used to manage economic crises when present in a
country. This variable will give an indication as to how interconnected these bubbles are with
economic crises that require a central bank response.
Inflation is captured by growth in the market country’s CPI index, a key relatively uniform
measure of inflation across different times and countries. The CPI measure could coincide with
asset price inflation, while also seemingly acting counter to some assets as increasing overall prices
reduces the capacity of individuals to speculate, which could cut a market runup short. This
variable is of interest for this very dichotomy and understanding how the factor impacts different
kinds of bubbles.

Unemployment data is pulled from market countries’ official unemployment statistics reported
monthly by the government. This factor would intuitively be linked to business cycles and indicate
strength or weakness in the labor market, can contribute to stock bubble patterns. The variable
could also be seen to make an impact on bubbles for similar reasons as inflation, in pulling
speculators away from the market because they no longer have the risk appetite to push more
money into certain high-price sectors.
Industrial production growth figures are calculated from market countries’ industrial
production volume figures published monthly. This indicator would be directly indicative of
robust or weak health in the overall economy for a given period and could also be constructive if
bubbles seem to coincide with a lull in output activity. Such an outcome might imply that greater
production was expected at a certain time, but never materialized, resulting in a runup in asset
prices, followed by a subsequent collapse.
Monetary growth is calculated from a market country’s M2 money supply with respect to
month over month changes. The money supply is a useful variable as it can directly be funneled
into growing asset prices through its distribution coming from the banks, flowing to asset
appreciation rather than real inflation in the economy and possibly fueling bubble growth. The
factor could also be indicative of government economic support flowing from increased stimulus
as hard times begin to emerge in the throes of a market crash.
An additional analysis to specifically study the volatility associated with the ten bubbles was
conducted in the form of a GARCH model. GARCH models effectively provide an analysis of
conditional volatility for a time series dataset where current values could be a function of previous
values via a kind of volatility clustering. In the context of this study, the GARCH analysis is used
to understand trends in the volatility of asset prices through the bubble periods, with the particular

purpose of understanding if the rising and subsequent falling nature of prices themselves acts to
enforce the runup and drawdown effects that are seen in bubbles.
There are several pertinent tests in a GARCH reading that this study relies on. The
Weighted Ljung-Box Test examines a series’ autocorrelation within a model’s standard residuals,
with a null hypothesis that there is no auto-correlation present. Similarly, the Weighted ARCH
LM Tests check the data series for serial dependence, or autocorrelation, again with a null
hypothesis that autocorrelation is not present. Statistical significance in both the Ljung-Box and
ARCH LM tests indicates that the data series has a self-dependent component to it that is impacting
its forward trajectory, which could otherwise be interpreted as the bubble growing itself. The
Nyblom Stability Test assesses the data for significant changes in the series across time, which
would mean that the relationships between variables are changing over time, which would be
expected over the course of a bubble as the market begins to shift expectations. Next, the Sign
Bias Test determines if specific biases are significantly affecting the model through both positive
and negative shocks, or one particular kind of shock, with the null hypothesis being that such
shocks do not have an effect. Finally, the Adjusted Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test is creating a
comparison between the data’s distribution and a selected theoretical model to determine if there
is overlap, with the null hypothesis being that the empirical and theoretical models are the same
and no interesting divergences from a predicted distribution exist. Full readouts of the GARCH
tests referenced in the results section are available for examination in the Appendix.

4. Results
Initial results from the price analyses are quite telling in a number of areas. Beginning with
the individual bubble results, detailed below in Table 1, the South Sea Bubble stands out as a crisis
of particular note, with the shortest buildup time, the shortest bubble duration, the greatest total
bubble return (TBR), the greatest annualized TBR, and the highest daily change in price. There
are several other crises worth mentioning in the context of these results. The Asian Financial
Crisis had the smallest bubble peak, the lowest TBR, the lowest annualized TBR, and the lowest
daily change in price maximum. The Roaring Twenties had the longest buildup time, the longest
bubble duration, and the largest peak to trough price drawdown. The Stagflation Oil Crisis had
the longest bust period and the shortest build-to-bust ratio. The 2008 Oil Shock had the shortest
bust period and the highest build-to-bust ratio. The Dot Com Crisis had the highest bubble peak.
The Chinese Stock Bubble had the smallest bubble drawdown.
Table 1: Individual Price Analysis Highlights

The pricing analyses also revealed some interesting trends between crises, as highlighted
in Table 2 below, with the best performing averaged market statistics highlighted in green and the
worst highlighted in red. It is striking to see, from a general overview, equity crises tend to be
better on average than real estate or oil crises, with shorter bubble periods, higher TBRs, and the

shortest build-to-bust ratio, though they do have the highest bubble peaks, making them extremely
risky. Oil crises on the other hand tend to be very painful for investors, with the longest bust
periods, the lowest TBRs, the greatest volatility captured by high daily change in price, and the
longest build-to bust ratio. However, oil crises do benefit from having the shortest buildup periods
and the smallest bubble peaks, making them somewhat less likely to catch investors in the thralls
of intense speculation. Real estate crises are more neutral, though they do have the poor
characteristics of having the longest buildup periods, the longest total bubble durations, and the
lowest annualized TBR, although they do have the lowest volatility captured by high daily change,
making the asset more stable.
Table 2: Market-Segmented Price Analysis Highlights

Moving on to the regression analysis presented in Figure 1 below for Regression 1, it is
clear that the lagged dependent variable is the most significant factor for the movement of asset
prices, as it is statistically significant for all of the bubbles studied, apart from the Stagflation Oil
Crisis. This finding is more accentuated when viewed in the context of the GARCH analysis
results, presented later. Interest rates and unemployment are all found to be insignificant factors
across all bubbles. Inflation is positively statistically significant at the 5% level for the Asian
Financial Crisis, corresponding with increasing prices in the real economy along with the
appreciation of financial assets from increasing foreign investor capital, and vice versa during the
bubble’s precipitous fall. Industrial production growth is found to be statistically significantly
negative at the 5% level for the 2010s Oil Collapse and the Dot Com Crisis, while being

statistically significantly positive at the 0.1% level for the Japanese Real Estate Bubble. The
connection between industrial production growth and declining oil value in the 2010s most likely
results from the negative shock oil spikes and crashes produce for the rest of the economy, as it
was observed during this crisis that industrial and transportation companies benefited from falling
oil prices to increase their own production at lower costs. On a different track, the Dot Com Crisis
most likely reinforces a focus on real assets and the industrial economy in its crash, with much of
this bubble being caught in the emerging tech and software industries that had drawn attention
away from traditionally more profitable industrials businesses. Opposite from these, industrial
production greatly benefited from the investor capital asset price appreciation brought into Japan
during the time of its real estate boom, as the economy became inextricably linked with asset price
growth that afforded the overall economy a runway for growth. Finally, monetary growth is
statistically significantly negative and positive at the 5% level for the Dot Com Crisis and U.S.
Housing Crisis respectively. Such a dynamic falls in line with the previous reasoning for industrial
production being negatively related to the technology company price swings, with monetary
growth in the real economy acting as a similar measure on economic activity that receives more
attention with the fall of the Dot Com era, while the U.S. Housing bubble is directly linked with
the physical economy, as people push whatever money they have into real estate and homebuilding
or home buying.

Figure 1: Regression 1 Results

The next regression results from Regression 2, presented in Figure 2 below, exhibit the
robustness of the lagged dependent variable’s effect, as even incorporating lagged economic
variables does not change the significance or sign of the results. All bubbles, except for the
Stagflation Oil Crisis again, are shown to be statistically significantly negative, often at the 1%
level. Unemployment and lagged unemployment are both found to be insignificant factors for all
of the bubbles. Interest rates and lagged interest rates were significantly negative and positive
respectively for the Dot Com Crisis at the 5% level. This would seem to be indicative of a lagging
policy response by the central bank to respond to the bubbly economy through raising interest rates
as the economy begins to overheat from the bubble. Another significant result from the Chinese
Stock Bubble reflects the same dynamic for lagged interest rates, with a positive statistically

significant coefficient at the 5% level. Inflation is statistically significantly positive at the 1%
level for the Asian Financial Crisis, while lagged inflation is statistically significantly negative at
the 0.1% level for the 2008 Oil Shock and at the 1% level for the 2010s Oil Collapse. Inflation
corresponding with the Asian Financial Crisis makes sense, as part of the bubble involved rapid
appreciation of countries’ currencies, which would naturally lead to rapid price appreciation in the
real economy. Lagged inflation would seem to follow with these two oil bubbles from a
commodities impact perspective, as the previous inflation reflects the increasing costs to industry
for usages of oil, such as in gas for transportation or petroleum for plastics. Industrial growth is
statistically significantly negative and positive respectively at 5% and 1% for the 2010s Oil
Collapse and the Japanese Real Estate Bubble, while lagged industrial growth is statistically
significantly positive at the 0.1% level for the U.S. Housing Crisis. The 2010s negative industrial
growth most likely arises from the previously mentioned negative impact of rising oil prices on
industry and the positive effect in Japan aligns with the explanation from Figure 1’s result, that
saw financial inflows from the bubble directly benefit the Japanese economy through real
production growth. The positive effect through the U.S. Housing Crisis bubble years most likely
stems from the growth of construction related industries that were pouring in investment at the
time to meet rising demand for new housing. Monetary growth is statistically significantly positive
during the U.S. Housing Crisis at the 1% level and statistically significantly negative during the
Dot Com Crisis at the 5% level. The impact during the Housing Crisis likely reflects the
underlying accelerating, then sudden decelerating economy that was pushed and pulled along by
the housing boom through its direct impact on bank lending and government-backed mortgage
loans. The identical effect on the Dot Com Crisis from Regression 1 for this variable points to the
same real economy versus digital economy dynamic previously proposed for this relationship.

Finally, lagged monetary growth is statistically significantly negative at the 5% level for the Asian
Financial Crisis, which most likely reflects an alteration in the monetary flows present within
Asian countries at this time as a result of surging foreign investor capital. A closer study of such
monetary flows is warranted to fully understand this relationship.

Figure 2: Regression 2 Results

Results from Regressions 3, 4, and 5 are best analyzed in concert, as the comparison
between them is quite meaningful from an interpretative perspective. Figures 3, 4, and 5 display
results from the correspondingly numbered regression models. Notably, the lagged dependent
variable is by far the most significant covariate in Regressions 3 and 4, with a statistically
significantly negative coefficient for seven and five of the nine and eight crises analyzed
respectively between the two regression models. In fact, the lagged dependent variable is the only
significant covariate for Regression 3, outside of 5% statistically significantly positive coefficient
for monetary growth in the Japanese Real Estate Crash. The significance of the lagged dependent
variable captures the buildup of the bubbles studied, which seems to indicate that the buildup of
bubbles is a self-perpetuating process that can exist outside the trends of traditionally significant
economic indicators. There are two other significant covariates for Regression 4, including
inflation, which is statistically significantly positive at the 1% level for the Asian Financial Crisis,
and industrial growth, which is statistically significantly positive at the 0.1% level for the Japanese
Real Estate Bubble. The positive inflation covariate for the Asian Financial Crisis in this
regression emphasizes the negative effects the crash had on Asian economies at large, as the
positive relationship with falling prices indicates that deflation was created in the wake of investor
capital pulling out of Asian financial markets. The positive industrial growth covariate for the
Japanese Real Estate Bubble reflects similarly to the Asian Financial Crisis, with the drawdown
of the crash dragging industrial production with it as a result of the importance of foreign capital
in the production economy that had benefited from the boom times. Finally, in inspecting the
results from Figure 5 for Regression 5, there is only one instance of a significant covariate,
including the previously steady lagged dependent variable. The one statistically significant result
is for industrial growth at the 5% level during the Japanese Real Estate Bubble, displaying the

strong positive relationship between financial assets and industrial production in Japan discussed
previously. This lack of other statistically significant covariates appears to display the true
unpredictable nature present in the heart of every bubble, as volatility reigns supreme above all
possible predictable variables. The lack of other significant covariates may also arise from the fact
that a mere twelve data points are analyzed for each crisis due to the desired emphasis on close
timing to the crisis event and the use of monthly data in this study. Perhaps if weekly or daily data
were utilized for the same crises and covariates, additional significant relationships may emerge
to shed light on if other factors are effectual in the midst of such financial turmoil.
Figure 3: Regression 3 Results

Figure 4: Regression 4 Results

Figure 5: Regression 5 Results

The final results to understand are from the GARCH analyses conducted for each of the
ten bubbles covered in this study. The readouts of each individual analysis can be found in the
Appendix. The main tests of interest for the GARCH analysis are the Nyblom Stability Test, the
Sign Bias Test, and the Adjusted Pearson Goodness-of-Fit Test. The Nyblom and Adjusted
Pearson tests inform the degree to which the time series data fluctuates from what would normally
be expected for time series data, whereas the Sign Bias Test detects the outsized influence of
positive and negative shocks to the dataset, which would be very informative when examining the
rise and fall of bubbles. As far as the Nyblom test, all bubbles were significant at the 1% level,
except for the Stagflation Oil Crisis which was significant at the 5% level. This indicates that all
of the crises had significant shifts in their volatility as time progressed, which would be expected

for the kinds of extreme price movements present during these crises. It is significant to note that
such an outcome also indicates that the extremity of the volatility within the crises changes as the
bubbles form and eventually pop, which is demonstrated in the various forms of positive or
negative sign bias that the Sign Bias Test reveals. There are four crises that have no significant
results from the Sign Bias Test, including the Roaring Twenties, the Japanese Real Estate Crash,
the 2010s Oil Collapse, and the Stagflation Oil Crisis. Negative sign bias is exhibited by the South
Sea Bubble at the 5% level and the Chinese Stock Bubble at the 10% level. Positive sign bias is
exhibited by the Dot Com Crisis at the 1% level, the Asian Financial Crisis at the 5% level, the
U.S. Housing Crisis at the 5% level, and the South Sea Bubble at the 10% level. Regular sign bias,
which signals the effect of positive and negative shocks is exhibited by the Dot Com Crisis at the
1% level, the Asian Financial Crisis at the 1% level, and the 2008 Oil Shock at the 5% level.
Negative sign bias would tend to be exhibited by crises that had more erratic changes in volatility
when prices were decreasing, as opposed to positive sign bias being exhibited in crises that had
more erratic changes in volatility when prices were increasing. Regular sign bias is seen in crises
that had rapid changes in volatility regardless of the direction and could be seen as an indicator for
the most extreme and unpredictable bubbles. All of these bias results provide a more accurate
picture for which aspects of particular bubbles were most significant from a volatility perspective.
Finally, the Adjusted Pearson Goodness-of-Fit test was found to be significant for all the crises,
serving as one final emphasis on the unpredictable nature of the bubbles’ volatility, as none of the
volatility models matched up against the theoretical ones tested against them. While not surprising
in its outcome, this test serves to reinforce the findings of the Nyblom Test for the irregularity of
the volatility within these bubbles.

5. Conclusions
Overall, the findings of this study are concentrated on the dramatic impact outsized and varying
levels of volatility have on a variety of bubbles over time. Based on different markets’ price
analysis, it seems relatively clear that equity bubbles are the least damaging overall for investors
caught in them, while oil bubbles have many nasty components and real estate bubbles are a mixed
bag. Turning to regression evidence, majority of bubbles seem primarily driven by their own
volatility and momentum, though a few crises exhibit significant relationships with important
economic factors, such as the Asian Financial Crisis with inflation, the Japanese Real Estate
Bubble with industrial production growth, and the 2010s Oil Collapse with industrial production
growth as well. Finally, the evidence supporting volatility itself as a primary driver of bubbles is
bolstered by results from the GARCH analyses that detect significant variations from normal time
series patterns for all of the bubbles, with quite a few also displaying sign biases during bubble
growth or decline that help to influence the unpredictable nature of bubbles’ volatility.
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I.
Price Charts for Individual Bubbles
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II.
Volatility Charts for Individual Bubbles
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III.

Price Statistics for Individual Bubbles
South Sea Bubble
Bubble Start Price
Bubble Start Date
Bubble Peak Price
Bubble Peak Date
Bubble Trough Price
Bubble Trough Date
Time to Climb
Time to Decline
Bubble
Drawdown
Bubble Start to End Return
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
Highest Daily Change
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)

1,300.00
07/24/1719
9,825.00
01/14/1720
2,620.63
10/22/1720
174 days
281 days
655.77%
-73.33%
101.59%
75.48%
42.32%
0.62x

Roaring Twenties
Bubble Start Price
6.26
Bubble Start Date
08/27/1921
Bubble Peak Price
31.92
Bubble Peak Date
09/07/1929
Bubble Trough Price
4.46
Bubble Trough Date
07/09/1932
Time to Climb
2,933 days
Time to Decline
1,036 days
Bubble
410.00%
Drawdown
-86.03%
Bubble Start to End Return
-28.77%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
-3.07%
Highest Weekly Change
18.60%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
2.83x

Dot Com Crisis
Bubble Start Price
99.04
Bubble Start Date
01/03/1995
Bubble Peak Price
1,005.49
Bubble Peak Date
03/27/2000
Bubble Trough Price
184.06
Bubble Trough Date
09/30/2002
Time to Climb
1,910 days
Time to Decline
917 days
Bubble
915.22%
Drawdown
-81.69%
Bubble Start to End Return
85.84%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
8.33%
Highest Daily Change
22.30%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
2.08x
Chinese Stock Bubble
Bubble Start Price
1,011.50
Bubble Start Date
07/11/2005
Bubble Peak Price
6,092.06
Bubble Peak Date
10/16/2007
Bubble Trough Price
1,706.70
Bubble Trough Date
11/04/2008
Time to Climb
827 days
Time to Decline
385 days
Bubble
502.28%
Drawdown
-71.98%
Bubble Start to End Return
68.73%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
17.06%
Highest Daily Change
9.46%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
2.15x

Asian Financial Crisis
Bubble Start Price
459.07
Bubble Start Date
08/21/1992
Bubble Peak Price
1,138.75
Bubble Peak Date
11/08/1994
Bubble Trough Price
280.00
Bubble Trough Date
06/16/1998
Time to Climb
809 days
Time to Decline
1,316 days
Bubble
148.06%
Drawdown
-75.41%
Bubble Start to End Return
-39.01%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
-8.14%
Highest Daily Change
8.50%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
0.61x
Japanese Real Estate Bubble
Bubble Start Price
394.56
Bubble Start Date
07/25/1984
Bubble Peak Price
2,458.70
Bubble Peak Date
12/04/1989
Bubble Trough Price
585.09
Bubble Trough Date
08/18/1992
Time to Climb
1,958 days
Time to Decline
988 days
Bubble
523.15%
Drawdown
-76.20%
Bubble Start to End Return
48.29%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
5.00%
Highest Daily Change
12.40%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
1.98x

U.S. Housing Crisis
Bubble Start Price
138.95
Bubble Start Date
10/09/2002
Bubble Peak Price
370.57
Bubble Peak Date
02/07/2007
Bubble Trough Price
85.52
Bubble Trough Date
03/06/2009
Time to Climb
1,582 days
Time to Decline
758 days
Bubble
166.69%
Drawdown
-76.92%
Bubble Start to End Return
-38.45%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
-7.29%
Highest Daily Change
18.82%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
2.09x
2008 Oil Shock
Bubble Start Price
23.23
Bubble Start Date
04/29/2003
Bubble Peak Price
143.95
Bubble Peak Date
07/03/2008
Bubble Trough Price
33.73
Bubble Trough Date
12/26/2008
Time to Climb
1,892 days
Time to Decline
176 days
Bubble
519.67%
Drawdown
-76.57%
Bubble Start to End Return
45.20%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
6.80%
Highest Daily Change
19.88%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
10.75x

2010s Oil Collapse
Bubble Start Price
39.41
Bubble Start Date
02/18/2009
Bubble Peak Price
128.14
Bubble Peak Date
03/13/2012
Bubble Trough Price
26.01
Bubble Trough Date
01/20/2016
Time to Climb
1,119 days
Time to Decline
1,408 days
Bubble
225.15%
Drawdown
-79.70%
Bubble Start to End Return
-34.00%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
-5.83%
Highest Daily Change
11.29%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
0.79x
Stagflation Oil Crisis
Bubble Start Price
13.83
Bubble Start Date
04/30/1978
Bubble Peak Price
42.00
Bubble Peak Date
11/30/1979
Bubble Trough Price
9.56
Bubble Trough Date
07/31/1986
Time to Climb
579 days
Time to Decline
2,435 days
Bubble
203.69%
Drawdown
-77.24%
Bubble Start to End Return
-30.87%
Bubble Start to End Annualized Return
-4.37%
Highest Monthly Change
40.90%
Bubble Build/Burst (Time to Climb/Decline)
0.24x
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